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Canine Profiling: Does Breed-Specific
Legislation Take a Bite out of Canine
Crime?
Heather K. Pratt*
I.

Introduction

On January 26, 2001, San Francisco police and paramedics
encountered a horrific scene at a Pacific Heights apartment building,
where a thirty-three year old woman, Diane Whipple, was lying in a pool
of blood after having suffered seventy-seven dog bite wounds inflicted
by two Presa Canario dogs.' Diane Whipple died approximately five
hours later at San Francisco General Hospital.2 The dogs' owners,
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2004. Dedicated to Langston, Lorenzo, and Nelson.
1. See
Kenneth
Phillips,
The
Diane
Whipple
Case,
at
http://www.dogbitelaw.com/PAGES/Whipple.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2003). The
Presa Canario ("Canary Dog") was originally bred for dog fighting. Canary Dog, at
http://www.dogbreedinfo.com/canarydog/htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2003).
Presa
Canarios are muscular, tenacious, and large, sometimes weighing more than one hundred
pounds. Id.
2. Phillips, supra note 1. Robert Noel and Marjorie Knoller, husband and wife,
were both criminally charged, but Knoller was present during the attacks and as a result
was also charged with second-degree murder. Id. Knoller was paroled on January 1,
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Marjorie Knoller and Robert Noel, were subsequently convicted of death
caused by a mischievous animal and involuntary manslaughter, and they
were both sentenced to four years in jail as a result of the horrific
of second-degree murder, but the
mauling. 3 Knoller was also convicted
4
trial judge threw out her conviction.
The Whipple case is a chilling and extreme example of what can
happen when dogs "go bad." Today, there is what could rightfully be
characterized as a dog bite epidemic in the United States. 5 "Every forty
seconds, someone in the United States seeks medical treatment for a dog
bite."6 Dogs bite more than 4.7 million people each year. Moreover,
approximately 800,000 people seek medical care for dog bites each year;
more than half are children. 8 The American Veterinary Medical
Association ("AVMA") estimates that one dozen dog attacks prove fatal
each year. 9
The societal costs of dog bites are quite high.' 0 Hospital costs for
dog-bite-related visits to emergency rooms are estimated to be 102.4
million dollars annually." This, however, represents only a fraction of
the overall costs to society.1 2 Other costs include health insurance and

2004, after serving more than half of her sentence. Newscast (NBC television broadcast,
Jan. 2, 2004). Noel was paroled in September 2003. Knoller, Convicted in Dog Mauling
Released from Prison, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 2, 2004. Both Knoller and Noel will be on
probation for three years. Id.
3. Phillips, supra note 1.
4. Id. Superior Court Judge James Warren threw out Knoller's conviction because
there was not enough evidence to meet the required legal standard. See Dog Mauling
Decision, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/06/17/dog.mauling.decision/
(last visited Jan. 17, 2004).
5. Phillips, supra note 1.
6. Dog Bite Law Center, Dog Bite Statistics, at http://www.dog-bite-lawcenter.com/pgs/stats.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2003).
7. Press Release, American Veterinary Medical Association, Model Community
Dog Bite Prevention Program Aims To Take Bite out of Canine Aggression (May 31,
2001) (on file with author).
8. Id.
9. Am. Veterinary Med. Ass'n, Dog Bite Prevention Message Points, at
http://www.avma.org/press/publichealth/dogbite/messpoints.asp (last visited Dec. 30,
2003).
10. Dr. Bonnie V. Beaver et al., A Community Approach to Dog Bite Prevention, 218
J. AM. VETERINARY MED. Ass'N 1732, 1733 (2001), available at http://www.avma.org
(last visited Dec. 30, 2003). Dr. Bonnie Beaver is a board-certified veterinary behaviorist
and chair of the American Veterinary Medical Association Task Force on Canine
Aggression and Human-Canine Interaction. Id. The Task Force was created to help
communities address dog bite problems. Id.
11. Harold B. Weiss et al., Incidence of Dog Bite Injuries Treated in Emergency
Departments,279 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 51, 53 (1998).
12. Beaver et al., supra note 10, at 1733.
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workers' compensation claims for lost pay and/or lost time from work.' 3
Insurance companies reportedly pay out 310 million dollars annually for
dog bite claims, which comprises roughly one-third of total claims paid
on homeowners' and renters' insurance policies nationwide.14
Communities concerned with the severity of their dog-bite-related5
problems sometimes enact laws that target specific breeds for control.
Often referred to as "Breed-Specific Legislation" ("BSL"), these laws
and regulations are enacted not only to control so-called vicious dogs,
but also to convince constituents that local officials care about
"dangerous dogs" and want to reduce the number of serious injuries
inflicted by them. 16 BSL often supplements already existing animal
control laws. 17 Dog breeds that allegedly pose the highest risk and are
the most likely targets for BSL are: Pit Bulls, Rottweilers, German
Shepherds, Huskies, Alaskan Malamutes, Doberman Pinschers, Chow
Chows, Great Danes, St. Bernards, and Akitas. 8
This Comment explores the constitutionality and effectiveness of
BSL and proposes several alternatives to combat America's dangerous
dog problem. Specifically, Part II of this Comment explores the nature
of the relationship between man and dog by examining both the history
of dog domestication and the evolution of American dog-regulation
jurisprudence. Part III of this Comment analyzes the constitutionality of
BSL and the likelihood of mounting a successful constitutional challenge
to BSL. Part IV examines recent legislative and corporate attempts to
ban or restrict dogs by breed. Part V presents several alternatives to
breed banning, including enforcing current laws more effectively,
mandating strict liability for owners of "dangerous" dogs, and providing
exemptions for "good" dogs where breed-specific laws already exist.
In conclusion, it is the author's assertion that breed bans, though
appealing to some as a quick fix for a serious problem, are not the
answer. The proper focus is the dog owner, not the dog. The American
Veterinary Medical Association ("AVMA"), the Humane Society of the

13.

Id.

14.

Pam Runquist, Special Report: Breed Blacklists-The Easy Way out for

Insurance Companies, UNITED ANIMAL NATIONS J. (2002).

15.
16.
Good

Beaver et al., supra note 10, at 1736.
Norma Bennett Woolf, Dogs and the Law: When Emotion Enters the Door,
Sense

Often

Flies

out

the

Window,

DOG

OWNER'S

GUIDE,

at

Logic,

at

http://www.canismajor.com/dog/lawsl.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2004).
17. See Beaver et al., supra note 10, at 1736.
18.

See

Katherine

Dokken,

Dog

Bite

Statistics:

Bad

http://www.thedogplace.com/library/articles156.htm
(last visited Dec. 30, 2003)
(developing list from the breeds on the Centers for Disease Control roster); see also
Runquist, supra note 14 (failing to identify Akitas as one of the most dangerous breeds).
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United States ("HSUS"), 19 the American Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals ("ASPCA"),2 ° and the Centers for Disease Control
("CDC") 21 all oppose breed bans, asserting that the responsibility for
dog-related injuries lies with the owner, not the dog, because most often
dogs that bite have not been properly socialized.2 2 According to the
HSUS, any dog can be dangerous.2 3 In fact, a Pomeranian, a small lap
dog, recently killed a six-month-old infant 4 Breed bans may make
people feel more secure, but laws that focus on getting rid of particular
dog breeds is not the best solution to the dog bite problem.
II.

Dog Domestication and Early Animal-Regulation Jurisprudence

Only two animals have entered the human household otherwise than
as prisoners and became domesticated
by other means than those of
25
enforced servitude: the dog and the cat.
The relationship between dogs and people goes back more than
twelve thousand years. 26 It is estimated that there are approximately
fifty-three million dogs in the United States, a larger number per capita
than any other country in the world2 7 Roughly forty percent of U.S.
households own at least one dog.28
29
Some theorists believe that all dogs descended from the grey wolf,
while others assert that dogs descended from jackals or a common
ancestor of the jackal and the wolf.30 No one is sure exactly how or

19. Press Release, American Veterinary Medical Association, AVMA Joins National
Dog Bite Prevention Effort (Mar. 1, 2000) (on file with author).

20.

Press Release, American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals,

ASPCA Says: Most "Dangerous Dogs" Are Created by Dangerous People and Urges
Responsible Pet Ownership (May 1, 2001) (on file with author).

21.

Press Release, Centers for Disease Control, Dog Prevention Week (2003),

available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/duip/biteprevention.htm (last visited Dec. 30,

2003).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 23-26.
Ignored,
23. When
Breed
Should
be
http://www.pitbullsontheweb.com/petbull/hsus.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2003).
6-Week-Old
Girl,
24. Pomeranian
Kills
http://www.igorilla.com/gorilla/animal/2001/pomeranian.html (Dec. 30, 2003).
25.

at

at

MARY RANDOLPH, DOG LAW: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR DOG OWNERS AND THEIR

NEIGHBORS 1/2 (3rd ed. 1997).

26.
27.

Beaver et al., supra note 10, at 1733.
Id.

28.

RANDOLPH, supra note 25, at 1/2-1/3.

29.

Rebecca

Kodat,

Evolution

of

Dogs,

http://ny.essortment.com/dogsevolution rlpr.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2003).
30. RANDOLPH, supra note 25, at 1/2-1/3.

at
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when dogs became domesticated. 3' The domestication of the dog may
have begun when ancient man started to tame and befriend wolves, 32 or
wild dogs may have evolved into domesticated ones as they roamed
outside human camps hoping to find food.33
Though they may not agree on when, most experts agree that the
dog was the first animal to be domesticated.34 Eventually, man began to
breed dogs, with the desire to create or emphasize certain characteristics,
focusing on those traits that were considered the most needed at the
36
time.35 Today there are more than 350 breeds of domestic dog.
Today's dog serves mainly as man's companion,37 though "man's best
friend" may still possess some of the characteristics of the wolf,
including the exhibition of territorialism and suspicion of strangers.3 8
Dogs occupy a unique place on the American legal landscape.39
Under English common law, dogs were not recognized as property
because they were considered to have intrinsic value only to their
owners.
Early American animal-regulation jurisprudence echoed
English common law and failed to recognize dogs as property.4' In the
landmark canine-regulation case, Sentell v. New Orleans, the United
States Supreme Court stated that the property in dogs is of an
"imperfect" or "qualified" nature.42
At the time Sentell was decided, dogs were not afforded the same
legal status as other domestic animals like cattle, horses, and sheep.43
The Sentell Court stated that dogs are kept "for pleasure, curiosity or
caprice," and unlike other animals they have no value as workers or as
providers of food or drink.4 The Court reasoned that though there are
"valuable" dogs in which an owner may have an interest, there are other
dogs "afflicted with such serious infirmities of temper as to be little
'
better than a public nuisance. ,5
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1/2.
33. Id.
34. Id.at 1/3.
35. Id.
36. Kodat, supra note 29.
37. RANDOLPH, supra note 25, at 1/4.
38. See Kodat, supra note 29.
39. See generally Lynn Marmer, The New Breed of Municipal Dog Control Laws:
Are They Constitutional?,U. CiN. L. REv. 1067, 1069 (1984).
40. See id. at 1069-70; see also Sentell v. New Orleans, 166 U.S. 698, 701 (1897).
41. See Sentell, 166 U.S. at 698; see also Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 23031(1920).
42. Sentell, 166 U.S. at 701.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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The Court further stated that the public's interest in destroying
worthless dogs outweighs a dog owner's interest in keeping a dog, even
when a dog might in fact be valuable.46 Because the Court recognized
only a qualified property interest in dogs, it denied relief to the owner
whose dog had been hit and killed by a railroad car,47 stating that "from
time immemorial, [dogs have] been considered as holding their lives at
the will of the legislature., 48 Because dogs were not recognized as
property, states were allowed to implement strict regulations without fear
of compromising a dog owner's constitutional rights. 49 The modem
view, however, is that dogs are property and that the government's
ability to regulate them is not without limitation.5 °
Despite the fact that many states consider dogs to be personal
property, the term "qualified" is still used, and dogs, as property, are
treated differently from other personal property when states regulate
them using their police powers. 51 In fact, dogs have been subject to
greater regulation than any other class of domestic animal. Examples
of the valid exercise of state police powers include leash laws, 53 laws that
limit the number of dogs that an owner may keep,54 and laws that
prohibit owners from harboring noisy dogs. 55
States are not the only regulators. States may and do grant local
governments the right to exercise police powers.5 6 As such, local
governments often regulate various aspects of dog ownership including

46. Id.at 701-02.
47. Id. at 706.
48. Id. at 702.
49. Mariner, supra note 39, at 1070.
50. See, e.g., Thiele v. Denver, 312 P.2d 786, 789 (Colo. 1957) (stating that dogs are
accorded full property status in Colorado, but holding that Denver's "Leash Law" was a
valid exercise of police power); 4 AM. JUR. 2d Animals § 6 (2002) (recognizing modem
trend to afford dogs full property status, but also acknowledging state power to decide
whether to afford dogs such status).
51. 4 Am.JUR. 2d Animals § 6 (2002). "In some respects... property in dogs is of
an imperfect or qualified nature and they may be subject to peculiar and drastic police
regulations by the state without depriving their owners of any constitutional right." Id.
52. Id.
53. See Thiele, 312 P.2d at 789; see also Brotemarkle v. Snyder, 221 P.2d 992, 993
(Cal. Ct. App. 1950).
54. See, e.g., Gates v. Sanford, 566 So.2d 47, 49 (Fla. App. 1990) (holding that
ordinance prohibiting ownership to three dogs and three cats per residence was not
unreasonable). But see Commonwealth v. Gardner, 74 Pa. D. & C. 539, 545-46 (1950)
(keeping more than six dogs over six months of age is not negligence per se and declaring
such is an arbitrary exercise of the police power).
55. See, e.g., Lear v. State, 753 S.W.2d 737, 740 (Tex. App. 1988).
56. McPhail v. Denver, 149 P. 257 (Colo. 1914) (stating that it is within the state's
power to permit cities and towns to exercise "such parts of the police power as it may
deem proper") (citing Sentell v. New Orleans, 166 U.S. 698 (1897)).
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licensing, vaccinating, and leashing. 7
Corporate America is hopping on the breed-banning bandwagon as
well. For example, some insurance carriers, fearing liability, refuse to
issue policies to owners of "blacklisted" breeds.5 8 Insurance carriers'
ability to impose outright bans may become increasingly difficult, as
from
some states have begun to propose legislation that prohibits insurers
59
making insurance coverage decisions based on breed ownership.
Insurance companies are not the only businesses to ban breeds.6 ° In
August 2002, American Airlines announced that it would no longer ship
Rottweilers, Doberman Pinschers, American Staffordshire Terriers, Bull
Terriers, American Pit Bull Terriers, and any mixed breeds containing
one or more of those breeds. 6 1 The ban, however, was lifted in May
2003.62 Instead of banning breeds, American Airlines implemented new
container requirements for all breeds, which include providing cable ties
to reinforce traveling crates.63
It is understandable that people want to feel safe, and dog attacks,
especially the most gruesome ones, often make the news. Breed bans
may make individuals feel better, but politicians eager to please their
constituents often impose bans as a knee-jerk reaction to constituent
concerns.
Some people liken certain breeds to assault weapons,
theorizing that they are inherently dangerous and that they should be
altogether eliminated.64 But, such bans may be ineffective.
III.

The Constitutionality of Canine Regulations

Dogs are regulated through a state's police powers.6 5 Police powers
are those that a state uses in order to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of the public.66 A health, safety, or welfare regulation is
presumed to be constitutional as long as there is a rational relation
57. See generally RANDOLPH, supra note 25, at 2/1-2/27.
58. See Pam Runquist, Special Report: Breed Blacklists-The Easy Way out for
InsuranceCompanies, UNITED ANIMAL NATIONS J. (Summer 2002) (on file with author).
59. See, e.g., A. B. 6761, 226th Sess. (N.Y. 2003) (proposing legislation that would
prohibit insurers from canceling or refusing to issue a policy based on ownership of a
specific breed).
60. See, e.g., Am. Kennel Club, American Airlines Implements Breed-Specific
Policy, at http://www.akc.org/love/dip/legislat/aa-bansbreeds.0902. cfm. (last visited
Jan. 11, 2003) (on file with author).
61. Id.
62. Am.
Kennel
Club, American Airlines Lfts
Breed Ban,
at
http://www.akc.org/news/index?articleid=1753 (last visited Dec. 31, 2003).
63. Id.
64. Marianna R. Burt, Canine Legislation: Can Dogs Get a Fair Shake in Court?,
210J. AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS'N 1139 (1997).
65. See Sentell v. New Orleans, 166 U.S. 698, 706 (1897).
66. See Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818 (1879).
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between the means (regulation) and the ends (promotion of the public's
health, safety, or welfare). 67 Local governments are also afforded
discretion to exercise such powers, as long as their regulations do not
contravene the general laws of the state.68
The police power is broad, but not unlimited. 69 Despite a strong
presumption of constitutionality, challenges to canine regulations on
constitutional grounds continue.
Specifically, citizens have often
attacked regulations as improperly infringing on their due process and
equal protection rights.7 °
A.

Due Process Challenges to Canine Regulation
1.

Invoking the Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine

Plaintiffs frequently challenge BSL regulations on the basis that
they are vague and violate due process rights.7 ' Vague laws are
unconstitutional because they can "trap the innocent" by failing to
72
provide adequate notice of what constitutes objectionable behavior.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine has two principle requirements.73 First,
the average person must be able to tell whether his or her conduct is
forbidden,74 and second, the legislature must establish minimal
guidelines for law enforcement, ensuring that enforcement is neither
arbitrary nor discriminatory. 75 In one early canine-regulation case,

67. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934).
68. Vanater v. Viii. of S. Point, 717 F. Supp. 1236, 1241 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (citing
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905)).
69. Sentell, 166 U.S. at 704-05.
70. See, e.g., Am. Dog Owners Ass'n v. Dade County, 728 F. Supp. 1533, 1538
(S.D. Fla. 1989) (challenging county ordinance regulating Pit Bull Dogs on due process
grounds alleging that the ordinance was vague); Vanater, 717 F. Supp. at 1243-44
(challenging ordinance on due process and equal protection grounds); Holt v. City of
Maumelle, 817 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Ark. 1991) (challenging animal control ordinance
alleging that it was impermissibly vague and therefore violated due process rights);
Garcia v. Vill. of Tijeras, 767 P.2d 355, 361 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988) (challenging
ordinance on due process and equal protection grounds); Greenwood v. City of North Salt
Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 818 (Utah 1991) (challenging ordinance on due process and equal
protection grounds).
71. See Am. Dog Owners Ass'n, 728 F. Supp. at 1538; Vanater, 717 F. Supp. at
1243-44; Holt, 817 S.W.2d at 210; Heam v. City of Overland Park, 772 P.2d 758, 759
(Kan. 1989); Garcia,767 P.2d at 356; Greenwood, 817 P.2d at 818.
72. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
73. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983).
74. Id.
75. See id. (acknowledging the two requirements but stating that the most important
aspect is not notice, but rather provision of minimal guidelines for law enforcement).
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Garcia v. Village of Ti'eras,76 plaintiffs challenged the Village's use of
the term "American Pit Bull Terrier" in its ordinance, which banned Pit
Bull ownership and possession.77 The plaintiffs argued that the term
78
"American Pit Bull Terrier" was used only by the United Kennel Club
and that such a term could not possibly put owners on notice because a
different term, "American Staffordshire Terrier," was used by the
American Kennel Club to register the same breed. 79 The plaintiffs also
and
argued that other breeds, including the "Staffordshire Bull Terrier,"
80
the "Bull Terrier" might also fairly be described as "Pit Bulls."
Despite the fact that the New Mexico court recognized "American
Staffordshire Terrier" as the more technical term, the court nevertheless
found that "American Pit Bull Terrier" was an acceptable designation, 8'
reasoning that "Pit Bull" is a generic term and that such a dog is readily
identifiable from its physical appearance.82 Because the New Mexico
court found that such dogs are recognizable by the general population,
the ordinance passed muster under the plaintiffs' vagueness challenge
and was found to be equally applicable to dogs registered as "American
Terriers" as to those registered as "American Pit Bull
Staffordshire
' 83
Terriers.
A challenge similar to the one made in New Mexico failed in Ohio,
where an ordinance 84 passed by the Village of South Point prohibited
owning or harboring a "Pit Bull Terrier" or "any other type of vicious
dog" within the Village limits. 85 The Ohio court reasoned that because
an ordinary person could easily find guidance in a dictionary or virtually
any dog book to ascertain whether the ordinance applied to him or her,
the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague.86 Moreover, the court
76. Garcia,767 P.2d at 356.
77. Id. at 357.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 358.
82. Id. at 357-58; see also Hearn v. City of Overland Park, 772 P.2d 758, 763 (Kan.
1989) (describing in detail the physical features of Pit Bulls, including a "short, squatty
body with developed chest, shoulders, and legs, a large flat head; muscular neck and a
protruding jaw," and stating that the appearance of these dogs typifies "strength and
athleticism").
83. Garcia,767 P.2d at 357-58.
84. In pertinent part, the ordinance defines "Pit Bull Terrier" as "[a]ny Staffordshire
Bull Terrier or American Staffordshire Terrier breed of dog, or any mixed breed of dog
which contains, as an element of its breeding the breed of Staffordshire Terrier as to be
identifiable as partially of the breed of Staffordshire Bull Terrier or American
Staffordshire Terrier by a qualified veterinarian duly licensed by the State of Ohio."
Vanater v. Vill. of S. Point, 717 F. Supp. 1236, 1239 (S.D. Ohio 1989).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1244.
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stated that the government is not required to craft legislation with
mathematical precision, 87 and that in order for a plaintiff to sustain a
challenge for facial vagueness, a plaintiff must prove not that a statute or
municipal ordinance
is imprecise, but that there is no standard at all
88
iterated in the law.
"Pit Bull" laws are not the only laws that have come under fire for
vagueness. A Michigan court recently upheld the constitutionality of the
Michigan Wolf-Dog Cross Act, 89 which was challenged by plaintiffs as
void for vagueness because an ordinary person would have difficulty in
determining whether he or she owned a wolf, a wolf-dog cross, or a
dog. 90 The Michigan court dismissed the plaintiffs' vagueness action
because the plaintiffs knew that they owned wolf-cross
dogs, and as such
91
they were aware that the Act applied to them.
Even if the plaintiffs did not know that they owned such an animal,
92
it is unlikely that the court would have sustained their challenge
because the Act requires that if there is any doubt as to whether the dog
is a wolf-cross, before an officer can enforce the law, that officer must
consult with an expert on wolf-dog cross identification.9 3 This
enforcement requirement ensures that no property is taken unless the
expert confirms the individual's violation of the law, and thus due
process rights are not violated.9 4 Perhaps most interestingly, the court
found that the dog-owning public is a special group with certain
87. Id. at 1243.
88. Id. (citing Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971)); see Holt v.
City of Maumelle, 817 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Ark. 1991) (holding that the city's ordinance
was not impermissibly vague because "a person of ordinary intelligence is placed on
sufficient notice ... to reasonably determine the prohibited conduct"); see also Am. Dog
Owners Ass'n v. Dade County, 728 F. Supp. 1533, 1536-38 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (stating that
the only requirement of a law is that individuals of reasonable intelligence be placed on
notice that conduct is forbidden).
89. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 287.1001-287.1023 (2000).
Section 287.1002(p)
provides that "Wolf-dog cross" means a canid resulting from the breeding of any of the
following:
(i) A wolf with a dog.
(ii) A wolf-dog with a wolf.
(iii) A wolf-dog cross with a dog.
(iv) A wolf-dog cross with a wolf-dog cross.

Id.
90.

Mich. WolfDog Ass'n v. St. Clair County, 122 F. Supp. 2d 794, 804 (E.D. Mich.

2000).
91. Id. at 805.
92. See id. at 804-05.
93. The Act defines "expert on wolf-dog cross identification" as "an individual who
has, cumulatively, at least ten years of training and field experience in wolf and wolf-dog
cross behavioral and morphological characteristics and who is recognized as an expert at
the state and national levels by others in the same field." Id. at 804.

94. Id.
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knowledge about the dogs that they own, and that due process
considerations 95 must be measured in terms of the knowledge and
understanding of dog owners, rather than of the general public.96
2.

Takings

Plaintiffs have also objected to canine laws as violative of due
process rights because such laws result in the taking of property without
just compensation.97 According to the New Mexico courts, such
objections are without merit because when there is a legitimate exercise
98
of police power, deprivations of private property are permissible.
Specifically, the court in Garcia v. Village of Tijeras found that because
all of the village residents were notified prior to enforcing the ordinance,
and because they could remove their dogs before enforcement, there was
no taking of property. 99 Importantly, however, the court did not reach
the issue of whether the ordinance's "destruction provision" could rise to
the level of a taking.' 00 Had a dog actually been destroyed, or had a dog
been threatened with destruction, the court may have rendered a different
decision.
The Colorado Supreme Court likewise struck down plaintiffs' claim
that Denver's "Pit Bulls Prohibited" ordinanceOi constituted an
unconstitutional taking of property. 0 2 The court reasoned that the
ordinance, because it permitted the owner of a Pit Bull who had a Pit
Bull license °3 and who complied with05 other minimum requirements' 0 4 to
keep the dog, did not effect a taking.'
95. The due process consideration here is whether the plaintiffs have been deprived
of property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. See id. at 797.
96. Id. at 803.
97. See Garcia v. Vill. of Tijeras, 767 P.2d 355, 356 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988); see also
Colo. Dog Fanciers, Inc. v. Denver, 820 P.2d 644, 653 (Colo. 1991).
98. See Garcia, 767 P.2d at 362; see also Sentell v. New Orleans, 166 U.S. 698
(1897).
99. Garcia,767 P.2d at 363.
100. Id.
DENVER, COLO., REV. MUN. CODE OF ORDINANCES ch.8, art. I1 § 8-55 (1989),
101.
available at http://livepublish.municode.com. (last visited Jan. 2, 2004).
102. Colo. Dog Fanciers,Inc., 820 P.2d at 654.
103. DENVER, COLO., REV. MUN. CODE OF ORDINANCES ch.8, art. 11 § 8-55 (1989),
availableat http://livepublish.municode.com.
104. Id. § 8-55(d)(1)-(9).
105. Colo. Dog Fanciers, Inc., 820 P.2d at 654. Keeping a dog within city limits is
only permissible for those owners who applied for and received a Pit Bull license on or
before August 7, 1989, the date that the ordinance was enacted. Id. The ordinance
otherwise makes it "unlawful for any person to own, possess, keep, exercise control over,
maintain, harbor, transport, or sell within the city any pit bull." DENVER, COLO., REV.
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Equal Protection Challenges to BSL

There have also been numerous unsuccessful challenges to BSL on
equal protection grounds. 10 6 The Supreme Court of Kansas, for example,
struck down the plaintiffs' argument that a city ordinance regulating the
ownership of Pit Bulls was unconstitutional because it "single[d] out" a
particular breed of dog.' 0 7 The court stated: "[T]he equal protection
clause is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly
irrelevant to the achievement of the [s]tate's objective.' ', 0 8 The court
found that some measure of inequality in a law's application does not
render the law unconstitutional.' 0 9 Rather, the court stated that if a law
does not reach a suspect class or infringe upon fundamental rights, the
law must be upheld if it is reasonable." 0
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that a Denver
ordinance that bans Pit Bulls"' did not violate a dog owner's right to
equal protection of the laws.' 2 Like the Kansas Supreme Court, 1 3 the
Colorado court stated that the appropriate test is whether the ordinance is
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.'1 4 The court
reasoned that the government had a legitimate interest in protecting the
health and safety of its citizens and that a law banning Pit Bulls was
reasonably related to that end because Pit Bull attacks are unlike other
dog attacks. 1 5 The Colorado court found that such attacks are more
serious than other attacks because they occur more often, and they are
more likely to result in death than attacks by other breeds." 16
Echoing the sentiments of the supreme courts of both Kansas and
Colorado, Pennsylvania courts have held that the proper constitutional
test is the rational basis test." 7 In applying the rational basis test, the

CODE OF ORDrNANCES ch.8, art. II, § 8-55 (1989), available at
http://livepublish.municode.com. (last visited Jan. 2, 2004).
106. See, e.g., Starkey v. Chester Township, 628 F. Supp. 196, 197 (E.D. Pa. 1986);
Colo. Dog Fanciers,Inc., 820 P.2d at 652; State v. Peters, 534 So. 2d 760, 763-64 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Hearn v. City of Overland Park, 772 P.2d 758, 766-68 (Kan. 1989);
Garcia v. Vill. of Tijeras, 767 P.2d 355, 360-61 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988); Greenwood v.
City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 820-21 (Utah 1991).
107. Hearn, 772 P.2d at 766.
108. Id.
MUN.

109.

Id.

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.; see also Colo. Dog Fanciers,Inc., 820 P.2d at 652.
Hearn, 772 P.2d at 766; see Colo.Dog Fanciers,Inc., 820 P.2d at 652.
Colo. Dog Fanciers,Inc., 820 P.2d at 652.
Hearn, 772 P.2d at 758.
Colo. Dog Fanciers,Inc. 820 P.2d at 652.

115.

Id.

116.
117.

Id.
Starkey v. Chester Township, 628 F. Supp. 196, 197 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
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court in Starkey v. Chester Township found that the township acted
reasonably when it enacted an ordinance that applied only to Pit Bulls
likewise justified in concluding that Pit Bulls are dangerous per
and was
8
se.

11

In State v. Peters, the Court of Appeals of Florida's Third District
reversed the trial court's finding that a Pit Bull ordinance" 9 was
1
The court stated that in order for an equal protection claim to
invalid. 20
stand, a plaintiff must demonstrate not that he or she was treated
differently from other dog owners, but that he or she was treated
differently from other Pit Bull owners. 12' The court further stated that a
law must not be held unconstitutional merely because its classification is
underinclusive and that22 lawmakers should be given wide latitude in
creating classifications.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals in Garcia,123 following the same
principle as the Florida courts, stated: "A legislature or municipal
governing body is entitled to address threats in a piecemeal fashion,
countering each threat as it arises."'' 24 When an ordinance neither
challenges fundamental rights, nor involves a suspect classification, it
will be presumed to be constitutional, and will be upheld as long as the
classification is "rationally related to a legitimate state interest.' 25 The
court reasoned that because attacks by Pit Bulls were of particular
concern, the legislature was within its discretion to 26address Pit Bull
attacks specifically, rather than address all dog attacks. 1
Finally, the Supreme Court of Utah, in Greenwood v. City of North
Salt Lake, 27 held that a city ordinance 28 that included Pit Bulls in its
definition of "vicious animal" violated neither the state nor the federal
118. See id.
119. See State v. Peters, 534 So. 2d 760, 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). The City of
North Miami ordinance requires pit bull owners to "post a surety bond, or furnish other
evidence of financial responsibility in the amount of $300,000 to cover any bodily injury,
death or property damage that may be caused by the dog." Id. Owners must also register
their pit bulls with the City and are required to confine them. Id.
120.
121.

Id.
Id. at 763.

122.

Id. at 763-64.

123.
124.
125.
126.

Garcia v. Vill. ofTijeras, 767 P.2d 355, 361 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).
Seeid. at 361.
Id.
Id. The court found that the state's interest in protecting its citizens' health and

welfare was legitimate, especially in light of the fact that a high percentage, nearly
twenty-five percent, of the village residents owned pit bulls, and there had been
numerous serious attacks on citizens. Id. at 358-59.
127. Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816 (Utah 1991).
128. NORTH SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, CODE § 13-20-16 (1987). The ordinance
requires a dog owner to acquire a special license, to confine and/or muzzle the dog, and
to purchase insurance. Id.
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equal protection clauses. 29 Because Pit Bulls are automatically
considered vicious under the ordinance, owners are required to license
their dogs and are also subject to special confinement requirements for
their pets, including muzzling.' 30
The plaintiffs alleged that the
ordinance violated their equal3 protection rights because it was both
overbroad and underinclusive.' 1
The overbroad argument failed because the court found that treating
Pit Bulls differently from other breeds was acceptable given their
"strength, agility, tolerance for pain, and aggressiveness" and because the
city "experienced a proportionally higher number of bites and attacks by
[pit bulls] than by other breeds."' 132 Likewise, the underinclusive
argument failed because the Utah court found that a law is not
33
unconstitutional merely because it fails to address "all possible evils.'
3. The Likelihood of Launching a Successful Challenge to
Breed-Specific Legislation on Constitutional Grounds
Successfully challenging breed-specific laws on constitutional
grounds is fraught with difficulty. Because owning a dog is not a
fundamental right, and dog owners are not a suspect class, laws passed to
regulate dogs and dog ownership will likely be upheld as long as the
laws are reasonable. 134 Both due process and equal protection challenges
35
to BSL have proved largely unsuccessful. 1
In order to prevail on a vagueness challenge, a plaintiff will either
have to prove that he or she did not receive notice, or that there are no
standards for law enforcement to follow in implementing a particular
law. 136 Lack of notice is a potentially weak argument because dog
129. Greenwood, 817 P.2d at 821. Plaintiffs also challenged the ordinance as
unconstitutionally vague and asserted that the law constituted a "taking of property
without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution." 1d. at 817. The court held that the ordinance was not vague either
on its face or as applied. Id. at 820. The court likewise found no taking. See id. at 821.
130. Id. at 817.
131. Id. at 820. An overbroad statute reaches permissible, lawful conduct as well as
unlawful conduct. In this case, plaintiffs argued that the ordinance unfairly requires
owners of harmless dogs to follow its provisions because "viciousness" is not a breed
characteristic. Id. at 821. The plaintiffs also argued, unsuccessfully, that the ordinance is
underinclusive because it does not include "many breeds" which may in fact be harmful.

Id.
132. Id. at 821.
133. Id.
134. See Heam v. City of Overland Park, 772 P.2d 758, 766 (Kan. 1989); Garcia v.
Vill. of Tijeras, 767 P.2d 355, 360 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988); see also Starkey v. Chester
Township, 628 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
135.

See supra text accompanying notes 71-133.

136.

Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983).

2004]

CANINE PROFILING

owners will be hard pressed to argue that they do not know what kind of
dog they own. 137 Defendants have successfully argued this point, 138 and
courts have likewise attributed special knowledge regarding dog
ownership to the dog-owning public,' 39 approaching vagueness
challenges based on lack of notice with skepticism.
The second requirement under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, that
minimal guidelines be provided for law enforcement,14 appears to mean
just that, "minimal." For example, the New Mexico Court of Appeals
found that the failure of a "Pit Bull" ordinance to "expressly set out
procedures" to be followed concerning an owner's notice and hearing
rights was not "fatal.' 4' Rather, the court stressed the well-settled
principle that laws are to be construed to avoid constitutional conflict
whenever possible. 142 Because the ordinance did expressly require a
judicial determination that a dog was properly classified as an "American
could take further action, no
Pit Bull Terrier" before the government
43
further statutory detail was necessary. 1
Similarly, challenging BSL as an impermissible "taking" will prove
equally difficult. Even if a dog is threatened with destruction, or is
actually destroyed, a plaintiffs task will be burdensome because the
United States Supreme Court stated that a determination of what
constitutes appropriate due process in terms of property deprivation
depends on "the nature of the property, the necessity for its sacrifice, and
the extent to which it has been regarded . . . as within the police
power."'

144

Even if it were assumed that dogs are property in the fullest sense of
the word, they would still be subject to the police power of the
[s]tate, and might be destroyed or otherwise dealt with, as in the
judgment4 5 of the legislature is necessary for the protection of its
citizens.1

137. See, e.g., Mich. WolfDog Ass'n v. St. Clair County, 122 F. Supp. 2d 794, 804
(E.D. Mich. 2000).
138. See id. at 804.
139. See id. at 803; see also Am. Dog Owners Ass'n v. Dade County, 728 F. Supp.
1533, 1539 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
140. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358.
141. Garcia v. Vill. of Tijeras, 767 P.2d 355, 361 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).
142. Id.
143. Id. But see Am. Dog Owners Ass'n v. Lynn, 533 N.E.2d 642, 646-47 (Mass.
1989) (commenting that the case before it was moot but providing future parties with
guidance and finding that an ordinance restricting ownership by breed would be declared
vague because it left law enforcement officials to use only their subjective judgment in
ascertaining whether a dog appeared to be a "pit bull").
144. Sentell v. New Orleans, 166 U.S. 698, 705 (1897).
145. Id. at 704.
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supporting

legislative leeway regarding dog control, ordinances often do provide
pre-destruction mechanisms, 46 allowing dog owners to contest a
classification of their
dog as either belonging to a specific breed 147 or as
148
being dangerous.
Equal protection arguments forged by plaintiffs will likewise prove
problematic because when there is no suspect class, the constitutional
test is one of rational relation, 149 and the equal protection clause 150 will
not be offended unless the classification is "wholly irrelevant to the
achievement of the [s]tate's objective."' 51 Further, in such an instance,
"[a] statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts may
52

reasonably be conceived to justify it."'

Because breed-specific laws are often passed in response to either
complaints from citizens or actual attacks, 53 the "wholly irrelevant"
standard will prove demanding for plaintiffs, while the rational relation
burden will likely be easy for states or municipalities to sustain. Once a
state or municipality has identified a risk to its citizens' safety, health, or
146. See, e.g., DENVER, COLO., REV. MUN. CODE OF ORDINANCES ch.8, art. II, § 8-55
(1989), available at http:/www. livepublish.municode.com (last visited Jan. 2, 2004)
(allowing for an owner to contest the classification of his or her dog as a Pit Bull by filing
a written petition and requesting a hearing); see also Garcia v. Vill. of Tijeras, 767 P.2d
355, 361 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988) (providing that a Pit Bull not be impounded until a court
of "competent jurisdiction" determines that it is in fact a Pit Bull).
147. See, e.g., DENVER, COLO., REV. MUN. CODE OF ORDINANCES ch.8, art. II § 855(f) (1989), available at http://www.livepublish.municode.com (last visited Jan. 2,
2004).
148. See, e.g., Sharon Montague, Sterling Takes Action Against Vicious Dogs, SALINA
J., May 23, 2002, available at http://www.saljoumal.com/stories/052302/new dogs.html
(last visited Jan. 2, 2004) ("potentially dangerous dog" ordinance requires police to notify
owners and schedule a hearing in municipal court for a ruling on whether a particular dog
is in fact dangerous).
149. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1973).
150. The equal protection clause referred to here is the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. States may have different constitutional requirements.
151. Heam v. City of Overland Park, 772 P.2d 758, 766 (Kan. 1989).
152. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
153. See, e.g., Garcia v. Vill. of Tijeras, 767 P.2d 355, 361 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988)
(enacting ordinance because of several serious Pit Bull attacks including the March 19,
1984 attack on Angela Hands, a nine-year-old who, after being mauled by four Pit Bull
dogs, will have to undergo reconstructive surgery until approximately age thirty- five; see
also Mich. WolfDog Ass'n v. St. Clair County, 122 F. Supp. 2d 794, 796 (E.D. Mich.
2000) (enacting Wolf-Dog Cross Act was "in memory of Angie Nickerson," a five-yearold girl who was attacked and partially eaten by a dog alleged to be a wolf-cross);
Starkey v. Chester Township, 628 F. Supp. 196, 197 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (passing law
banning Pit Bulls because the Township Dog Control Officer ranked Pit Bulls at the top
of the town's "danger list," and there were complaints that a Pit Pull had attacked a
child); see also Montague, supra note 148 (partial ban on Rottweilers adopted because of
three recent bite attacks).
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welfare, and has evidence of complaints or attacks, plaintiffs' ability to
successfully dismantle a government's rational relation argument is
highly unlikely.
IV. Recent Developments: Municipal, State, and Corporate Action To
Ban or Restrict Specific Breeds
A.

MunicipalLegislation

It is estimated that there has been a fifty percent increase in the
number of communities that have attempted to enact some sort of BSL in
the last five years. 54 Municipalities, however, have taken different
approaches to regulating dogs. Some communities simply ban certain
breeds, 55 while others allow so called "dangerous breeds" to remain
within city limits, as long as specific requirements are met. 156 Miami, for
example, allows Pit Bulls within city limits, but owners must comply
with stringent requirements.' 57 Likewise, Cincinnati permits Pit Bulls to
remain within its limits, but the city imposes severe restrictions on
continued ownership, including (1) limiting the number of Pit Bulls to no
more than one per household, (2) requiring annual police registration,
with color photographs, (3) mandating tattoos and implanted microchip
identification, (4) specifying confinement to mean locked pens with tops,
(5) requiring Pit Bulls to be muzzled and walked on a leash no longer
than three feet, (6) regulating transit, and (7)58 stipulating that owners
purchase at least $50,000 in liability insurance.
Still other municipalities have incorporated breed-specific language
within existing "dangerous" or "vicious" dog laws, labeling certain
154.

See Mike Pulfer & Dave Ferman, Clamping Down on Vicious Dogs, CINCINNATI
Feb.
16,
2001,
available
at
http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2001/02/16/temclampingdownon.html (last visited
on Jan. 2, 2004) (quoting Gail Golab, AVMA Assistant Director).
155. See, e.g., DENVER, COLO., REV. MuN. CODE OF ORDINANCES ch.8, art. 11, § 855(a) (1989), available at http://www.livepublish.municode.com. (last visited Jan. 2,
2004). Denver's ordinance makes it "unlawful for any person to own, possess, keep,
exercise control over, maintain, harbor, transport or sell within the city any pit bull." Id.
ENQUIRER,

156.

See,

e.g.,

MIAMI,

FLA.,

CODE

§

5-17.2

(1990),

available

at

http://www.livepublish.municode.com/4/lpext.dll/Infobase28/1/I f0f/2039/212 f'?.f=templat
es (last visited Jan. 2, 2004).
157. See id. § 5-17.2(a). In pertinent part, Miami's ordinance requires that "pit bull
dogs must at all times be securely confined indoors, or confined in a securely and totally
enclosed locked pen, with either a top or with all four (4) sides at least six (6) feet high,
and with a conspicuous sign displaying the words 'Dangerous Dog."' Id § 5-17.2(b).
The ordinance requires that if a dog is not confined that the dog be muzzled and leashed.
Id. The ordinance also prohibits Pit Bulls from either entering a school ground or from
being walked within fifty feet of any school. Id.
158.

Pulfer & Ferman, supra note 154.
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breeds as dangerous per se.' 5 9 Akron, for instance, groups Pit Bulls,
Canary dogs, and American Bulldogs within the generic term "vicious
dog" and imposes specific restrictions on these three breeds, including,
but not limited to, confinement, identification by tattoo, notification of
of the dog, and provision of
city authorities upon death or sale 60
1
officials.
city
to
dog
the
of
photographs
Although Pit Bulls are often singled out in various ordinances, it is
not the only breed that has communities on alert. 16 ' Recently, Sterling,
Kansas adopted an ordinance that partially bans both Pit Bulls and
Rottweilers.1 62 The ordinance is a partial ban because those Pit Bulls and
Rottweilers that are licensed and vaccinated for rabies by the ban's
effective date are permitted to stay in Sterling.' 63 Sterling, like other
communities,164 implemented the ban because Pit Bulls and Rottweilers
were creating most of the city's dog-related problems. 65 Sterling did not
stop at banning Pit Bulls and Rottweilers, however, but also revised its
"potentially dangerous dog" ordinance to reflect the city's overall
166
concern with controlling "vicious dogs."'
B.

State Legislation

There have been recent attempts by states as well as municipalities
to ban or severely restrict the ownership of certain breeds. 67 On June
13, 2002, Delaware's Speaker of the House introduced a bill that would
automatically label certain breeds of dogs as dangerous. 168 Just one week
159.

See,

e.g.,

AKRON,

OHIO,

CODE,

§

92.25

(1998),

available

http://municipalcodes.lexisnexis.com/codes/akron/_DATA/Chapter-92/25.html

at

(last

visited Jan. 2, 2004).

160.

Id.

161.

See, e.g., Montague, supra note 148.

162.
163.

Id.
Id.

164. See Garcia v. Vill. of Tijeras, 767 P.2d 355, 358-59 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988); see
also Vanater v. Vill. of S. Point, 717 F. Supp. 1236, 1239 (S.D. Ohio 1989)(enacting

ordinance because the mayor was concerned about the possible vicious nature of Pit Bills
"which came to light from media reports and calls from concerned citizens of South
Point").
165.

Montague, supra note 148.

166. Id Under the revision, Sterling allows any person who feels threatened by any
dog to report that dog to the police. Id.Once the police are contacted, the owners are
notified and a hearing is held to determine whether the dog is a danger to city residents.
Id.If the dog is found to be dangerous, the dog will either be removed from the city or

euthanized. Id.
167. See H.B. 571, 141st Gen. Assem. (Del. 2002) (proposing bill to automatically
label certain breeds as dangerous); see also A.B. 2906, 210th Leg. (N.J. 2002) (a bill

regulating Pit Bull ownership that was introduced in October 2002 but withdrawn from
consideration in May 2003).
168.

See H.B. 571, 141st Gen. Assem. (Del. 2002). These breeds included Pit Bulls,
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later, the Speaker, who is also the sponsor
for the bill, amended the bill
69
to remove all breed-specific language.'
New Jersey recently introduced a bill that would impose stringent
requirements on Pit Bull owners. 170 The proposed legislation, the
"Responsible Pit Bull Ownership Licensing Act," allows municipalities
to "attach such conditions to the issuance, renewal, or retention of a
license .. .as the municipality deems appropriate to protect the public
health, safety, and welfare."' 71 The Bill would, among other things,
permit municipalities to (1) charge up to seven hundred dollars for a Pit
Bull license, (2) require confinement of Pit Bulls in a secure enclosure
with a six foot fence, (3) require the Pit Bull owner to purchase liability
insurance, (4) seize and impound Pit Bulls where regulations are not
followed, and (5) fine owners up to one thousand dollars per day for
violations.172
In May 2003, the Bill was withdrawn from
73
consideration, but a Senate74 Bill virtually identical to the Assembly Bill
is still under consideration.1
C. Breed-Specific Legislation in the PrivateSector
1.

Airline Industry

On September 5, 2002, American Airlines announced a new policy
that it would no longer accept the following breeds for transport:
Rottweilers, Doberman Pinschers, American Staffordshire Terriers, Bull
Terriers, Pit Bull Terriers, or mixed breeds containing one or more of the
above mentioned breeds. 175 The airline implemented the policy shortly
after a Pit Bull Terrier was found running loose in the hold of one of its
planes. 176 The Pit Bull escaped from its kennel and chewed into part of

wolf-dog mixtures, Rottweilers, Japanese Tosas, Fila Brasilerios, and Presa Canarios. Id.
169. Id.
170. For
text
of
the
proposed
bill,
see
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2002/Bills/A3000/2906_l1.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2004).
171. Id.
172. Id.; see also Am. Kennel Club, New Jersey Looks at "Pit Bull" Restrictions, at
http://www.akc.org/news/index.cfm?article-id=1577 (last visited Jan. 2, 2004).
173. Am. Kennel Club, NJ Fanciers Win First Round in BSL Battle, at
http://www.akc.org/news/index.cfm?article-id=1719 (last visited Jan. 2, 2004).
174. id.
175. Am. Kennel Club, The American Airlines Ban on Breeds, at
http://www.akc.org/love/dip/legislat/aa ban_0902.cfm (last visited Jan. 11, 2003).
176. The American Airlines Pit Bull: Is This a Safety Feature Now, or Just More
Breed Discrimination?, at http://dogs.about.com/library/weekly/aa082102a.htm (last
visited Jan. 2, 2004).
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the plane's wiring system.' 77 As a result of the dog's escape, the plane
was grounded for nine days. 178 The ban, however, was lifted in May
2003.179
Instead, American Airlines implemented new container
requirements for all breeds, which include providing cable ties that will
reinforce traveling crates.' 80
Continental Airlines adopted restrictions regarding the transport of
American Pit Bull Terriers because of the "aggressiveness of the breed"
and the resulting potential danger.' 81 Continental, however, does accept
American Pit Bull Terrier puppies that meet specified age and weight
requirements.1 82 Continental's policy does not apply to American
Staffordshire Terriers, Bull Terriers, or miniature Bull Terriers. Though
Continental distinguishes among "Pit Bulls," some courts have not drawn
such distinctions.' 83 The various and conflicting terms used to define Pit
Bulls by courts and corporations support the contention that some
ordinances may indeed be vague.' 84 Courts have not focused on formal
able to ascertain
terminology, but rather on whether a dog owner was
85
whether a particular law would apply to him or her.'
2.

Insurance Carriers

Airlines are not the only corporate activists when it comes to BSL.
Insurance companies are taking part in breed banning by refusing to
write homeowners' policies for people who own aggressive dogs.' 86 The
Insurance Information Institute in New York estimates that the cost to
insurers for dog bite injuries is approximately 250 million dollars
annually, including medical treatment and "pain and suffering" damage
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See Am. Kennel Club, American Airlines Lifts Breed Ban, at
http://www.akc.org/news/index?article-id=1753 (last visited Dec. 31, 2003).
180. Id.
181. ContinentalAirlines Animal Policy, at http://www.continental.com (last visited
Jan. 2, 2004).
182. Id. Continental Airlines will accept an American Pit Bull Terrier as long as the
dog weighs under twenty pounds and is between eight weeks and six months old. Id.
183. Garcia v. Vill. of Tijeras, 767 P.2d 355, 358 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding
ordinance that uses term "American Pit Bull Terrier" as encompassing also "American
Staffordshire Terriers," recognizing both breeds as "Pit Bulls"); see Vanater v. Vill. of S.
Point, 717 F. Supp. 1236, 1239 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (including both "Staffordshire Bull
Terrier" and "American Staffordshire Terrier" in its ordinance's definition of "Pit Bull
Terrier," but not mentioning "American Pit Bull Terrier").
184. See supra text accompanying notes 71-96.
185. See Garcia,767 P.2d at 361; see also Hearn v. City of Overland Park, 772 P.2d
758, 763 (Kan. 1989).
186. DKKennels, Insurance Companies Take Part in Breed Banning, at
http://www.dkkennels.com/breedbanning.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2004).
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awards. 87 According to their own estimation, insurance
companies pay
188
out 310 million dollars annually for dog bite claims.
Because the risk associated with issuing homeowners' policies to
owners of "dangerous dogs" outweighs the dollar return, Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company has discontinued writing policies for
individuals who own Pit Bulls, Rottweilers, Chow Chows, German
Shepherds, and Bull Terriers. 89 Similarly, Nationwide Insurance has an
absolute ban on writing policies for Pit Bull, Rottweiler, Doberman
Pinscher, Chow Chow, and Wolf-hybrid dog owners.1 90 Nationwide's
policy to exclude certain breeds and their owners from coverage is a
recent decision based on cost/benefit analysis. 19'
Nationwide's policy offers no flexibility. A customer who owns a
"dangerous" dog will not be insured, despite a history of coverage with
Nationwide. 92 In addition to banning those dogs on Nationwide's
"dangerous list," Nationwide will also deny coverage for any dog that
193
either has a bite history or is a trained guard or attack dog.
Although many communities and corporate actors pass breedspecific laws to address their "dangerous" dog problems, BSL may not
be the most effective solution.
V.

Alternatives to Breed Bans

19 4
A primary concern with enacting BSL is that it may not work.
First, whether or not specific breeds pose a real threat is hard to ascertain
because dog bite statistics do not always provide an accurate portrayal of
dogs that actually bite.' 95 One problem that affects statistical data is
fluctuating popularity of particular breeds.' 96 The more popular a breed
becomes, the more likely it is that the total number of dog bites within
that breed will increase because that breed simply has more dogs that
could bite. 197 Second, those bites that do not produce serious injury are
often not reported. 198 Third, communities that do not keep accurate

187.

Id.

188.

Runquist, supra note 14.
DKKennels, Insurance Companies Take Part in Breed Banning,
http://www.dkkennels.com/breedbanning.html (last visited on Jan. 2, 2004).
190. Interview with Michael Ferster, Agent, Nationwide Insurance, in Carlisle, Pa.
(Jan. 10, 2003).

189.

191.

Id.

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id.
Id.
Beaver et al., supra note 10, at 1733.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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records will not know the numbers of each breed within their confines,
skewing comparisons made between and among breeds.1 99 Relying on
inaccurate statistics may cause communities to enact legislation that will
not effectively address a dog bite problem because the problem itself has
been misdiagnosed.2 °°
The Canine Task Force further iterates that a dog's tendency to bite
is based on at least five interacting factors, including heredity, early
socialization, training, health, and victim behavior. 2 01 Because any dog
can become dangerous under the right set of circumstances, 20 2 banning
particular breeds will not achieve the result that communities desire-to
reduce the number of dog bites and the injuries sustained from such
bites. There are alternatives to bans that make sense.
A.

Strict Enforcement of CurrentLaws
1.

Dangerous and Vicious Dog Laws

Many states or cities have so-called "dangerous" or "vicious" dog
laws, or animal restraint laws already on the books.20 3 These laws are
designed to regulate a dog's behavior and punish dogs and owners only
when a dog exhibits dangerous behavior, rather than labeling certain
specific breeds as vicious per se. Organizations that oppose breed20 4
specific legislation do not oppose all laws that govern dog ownership.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1736; see also Karen Peak, Dogs: The Failure of Breed Bans, at
http://www.petpeoplesplace.com/Care/Dogs/breeding.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2004).
202. Woolf, supra note 16; see also Am. Veterinary Med. Ass'n, supra note 9 (stating
that regardless of size or breed all dogs will bite if provoked).
203. See CAL. AGRIC. CODE § 31603 (2003) (vicious defined as when a dog in an
aggressive manner inflicts either serious injury or kills a human being, without
provocation); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-23-2109 (2002) (defining vicious dog as one that
bites or attempts to bite a person without provocation, or that "harasses, chases, bites, or
attempts to bite another animal"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:19-22 (1989) (amended 1994)
(declaring a dog vicious if by clear and convincing evidence the dog (1) kills a person or
causes serious bodily injury without provocation, or (2) has engaged in dog fighting
activities); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 459-502-A (West 2002) (proving dog is dangerous if
beyond a reasonable doubt (1) the dog has inflicted serious injury on a human being
without provocation, (2) killed or inflicted severe injury on a domestic animal while off
the owner's property, (3) attacked a human being without provocation, or (4) been used
in the commission of a crime).
204. See, e.g., Am. Kennel Club, Canine Legislation Position Statements, at
http://www.akc.org/love/dip/legislat/canleg.cfm (last visited Jan. 2, 2004). The American
Kennel Club supports "reasonable, non-discriminatory laws." Id.; see also Beaver et al.,
supra note 10, at 1737. Laws should be designed to convey the seriousness of the
situation to the owner, be reasonable to enforce, and provide exclusions for a dog's
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Once a dog is found to be dangerous or vicious pursuant to local laws,
however, an owner should be held strictly liable for future harm his or
her dog causes. Owning a dog that presents a foreseeable, serious risk to
others5 is analogous to engaging in an "abnormally dangerous" activity in
20

tort.

2.

Restraint and Licensing Laws

Communities can also take preventive measures before a dog is
deemed "dangerous" or "vicious." Laws that either confine a dog to its
property, or require it to be on a leash when not confined, limit the
number of free-roaming dogs and decrease the threat to public safety.20 6
Licensing laws help communities control their dogs in a number of ways,
including (1) providing an easy mechanism for identification if a dog is
involved in an incident, (2) ensuring that a dog's vaccinations are
current, (3) enabling a community to keep accurate records so that
statistics can be used effectively and so that accurate comparisons among
breeds are made, and (4) collecting fees that help offset20 7the cost of
providing an effective animal control enforcement program.
Of course, enforcing current laws will not be effective if a
community's animal control agency does not have enough resources.20 8
Animal control officers are a community's first line of defense against
so-called "dangerous" or "vicious" dogs. 20 9 An animal control agency
not only enforces the law, but can also be the agency responsible for dogbite-related investigations, data collection, and analysis. 210 Without
accurate data and effective enforcement, current laws cannot possibly
justifiable actions. id.
205. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977). "One who carries on an
abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to the person, land, or
chattels of another resulting from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care
to prevent the harm." Id.
The Restatement sets forth five factors for determining whether in fact an
activity is "abnormally dangerous." See id. § 520. Specifically, "[i]n determining
whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors are to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of
others; (b) the likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; (c) inability to
eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; (d) extent to which the activity is not
a matter of common usage; (e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is
carried on; and (f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its
dangerous attributes." Id. No one factor is determinative and all must be considered. Id.
§ 520 cmt. f.
206. Beaver et al.,supranote 10, at 1736.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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work, and more importantly, misleading data can fuel a community's
fears regarding particular breeds."
B.

Exempting "Good Dogs" when Breed-Specific Legislation Passes

Breed-specific legislation is on the rise. 212 Given the trends, it is
likely that communities will continue to enact breed-specific laws. If a
community decides that a certain breed poses a bonafide threat and
2 13 it will be difficult for
adopts breed-specific laws to address that threat,
2 14
law.
the
of
validity
the
plaintiffs to challenge
At a minimum, a dog owner should be allowed to apply for a
variance, as an owner of real property might do when a zoning ordinance
imposes a hardship on the real property owner. Permitting an owner to
obtain a use variance 215 would not thwart a community's efforts to ensure
safety for its citizens because a community could impose certain
conditions on an owner seeking the variance, such as (1) requiring the
owner to purchase mandatory liability insurance, (2) ensuring that the
dog satisfactorily completes obedience classes, and/or (3) allowing the
owner to keep his or her dog only if the dog is sterilized.2 16
VI.

Conclusion

Breed-specific legislation, however well intentioned, is not a
panacea for the nation's dog bite problem. In many instances, there are
already laws designed to check the behavior of dogs, including
"dangerous" dog laws and leash laws. 217 By enforcing these laws,
communities can reduce their risk of exposure to dog bites and attacks.
Such laws also hold owners responsible for the behavior of their animals.
A dog that is permitted to run free is much more likely to be involved in
a biting incident.
Focusing on individual dogs, rather than owners, is improper
because dogs have no choice about who raises them or how they are
raised. Owners, on the other hand, can take precautions by providing
their animals with appropriate medical care, exercise, training, and
211. Id.
212. Pulfer & Ferman, supra note 154.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 134-52.
214. See supratext accompanying notes 134-52.
215. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1551 (7th ed. 1999). A use variance permits
deviation from zoning requirements regarding use of a particular property. Id.
216. See Press Release, American Veterinary Medical Association, AVMA Joins
National Dog Bite Prevention Effort (Mar. 1, 2000) (on file with author). According to
AVMA, dogs that have not been spayed or neutered are three times as likely to bite than
those that have not. Id.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 203-07.
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socialization, greatly reducing the likelihood that their dogs will bite or
attack another animal or person. Breed-specific laws are attractive to
legislators because, just like dog attacks, these kinds of laws make the
news. Breed-specific laws can create a sense of security, albeit a false
one, within a legislator's community.
There is no question that regulating dogs is necessary. Dogs should
not be allowed to roam free, their behavior and actions unchecked. The
best solution, however, is not to ban breeds, but rather to pass new
legislation, or enforce current laws that target the behavior of the dog,
such as those that impose fines upon a dog owner when a dog has
Ultimately, it is the owner's
exhibited dangerous propensities.
responsibility to ensure that the animal is happy and healthy and does not
injure others.
Although breed-specific laws will not solve the dog bite problem,
they will probably continue to be passed as evidenced by their wide
acceptance by the public and by the courts. Given this reality, it is
recommended that the owners of "good dogs" have an opportunity to
seek appropriate legal exceptions, such as variances, for their pets. If an
owner chooses to keep a dog that has been deemed "dangerous" by
community standards, requiring that owner to take extra steps for the
privilege of ownership should not prove too great a sacrifice.

